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SCHNEIDER v. LAFFOON: INHERITANCE TAXATION
OF FOREIGN SITUATED PROPERTY SUBJECT
TO A SPECIAL POWER OF APPOINTMENT
In Schneider v. Laffoon' the Supreme Court of Ohio has rejected as taxable successions both the exercise and the nonexercise
of a special power of appointment by a resident donee where the
intangible property subject to such power was situated outside
Ohio. Upon first impression it would appear that the Ohio court
has rejected a clear trend expanding the jurisdiction of states to tax
powers of appointment over foreign intangibles. 2 Upon closer
analysis, however, the departure from the trend is fully justifiable
because the laws of Ohio have afforded nothing to the succession in
question for which it may exact a return in the form of an inheritance tax.
Differences in provisions of state inheritance tax statutes concerning the taxation of powers of appointment over foreign intangible property have been a prime cause of divergence of results
in this area.3 Thus in only the fifteen states 4 with statutes sub1. 4 Ohio St. 2d 89, 212 N.E.2d 801 (1965).
2. See Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657 (1942), overruling Wa-

chovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272 U.S. 567 (1926); Curry v. Mc-

Canless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939); Graves v. Elliott, 307 U.S. 383 (1939); Bullen
v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625 (1916); Chanler v. Kelsey, 205 U.S. 466 (1907);
Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189 (1903); Orr v. Gilman, 183 U.S. 278

(1902).

3. The treatment of powers of appointment at common law is to be
distinguished from transfer or inheritance tax statutes:
According to common-law concepts, the creation of a power of
appointment does not confer an estate and does not alter the fact
that the property subject to the power is derived from the donor
of the power rather than from the donee. Thus, without any special
provisions as to powers of appointment, property in which a testator creates a power of appointment is subject to inheritance tax as
passing under his will, even though the power is exercised, and the
transfer was not taxable at the time of the testator's death, because

of the absence of any basis for fixing the tax at that time.

Notwithstanding the common-law rule that the estate is
deemed to come from the donor of the power, it is competent for

the legislature to declare that the exercise of the power subsequent

to the passage of the law should be treated, for the purposes of
taxation, as creating an estate coming from the donee.
Statutes taxing the exercise or failure to exercise a power of
appointment have been held constitutional and do not violate due
process of law, even when applied to the exercise by will subsequent to their enactment of a power of appointment previously
created by deed, or when applied to the exercise by deed of a
power of appointment. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution does not forbid a state to tax a power of appointment over property of which the decedent was not the beneficial
owner and thus reduce the amount of his independent property
distributable to beneficiaries.
28 AM. JUR. Inheritance, Estate & Gift Taxes, §§ 209, 211 (1959).
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stantially similar to the Ohio statute could any conflict arise in the
instant situation. The courts of only two of these states have been
Powers are divided into two basic categories: "general" and "special"
or "limited". While general powers are exercisable in favor of any person,
including the donee's estate or creditors, special powers are exercisable
only in favor of a limited group, which does not include the donee. Morgan
v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940); Garfield v. State Street Trust Co.,
320 Mass. 646, 70 N.E.2d 705 (1947).
In many states the question of taxability of an exercise or nonexercise
of a special power of appointment over foreign situated intangibles would
present no difficulties. Such a result, however, obtains more by default
than by design (as the dearth of cases in this area indicates). In Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Nevada, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina and Utah, the legislatures have not
taken the initiative to pass inheritance tax laws. In Connecticut, Indiana,
Louisiana, New Hampshire and Wyoming, which have inheritance tax
statutes, no specific provisions have been enacted to tax the exercise or
non-exercise of powers. In this latter group, the property which is subject
to the power is taxed (if it otherwise satisfies the requirements for taxation) only in the estate of the donor of the power. See United States v.
Field, 225 U.S. 257 (1921) (confirmatory of the common law rule that
transfers under a power of appointment are transfers from the donor of the
power, rather than from the donee).
Several states have inheritance tax laws which merely confirm adherence to the common law rule. They are MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 151 (1957);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-20008.03 (1958); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 54:36-4, 5 (1960);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 2485-408 (Supp. 1966); TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-1602
(h) (1955).
The common law rule has proved difficult to apply. If the tax is estimated at the donor's death, it must subsequently be recomputed because
the rate of the tax is determined by the closeness or remoteness of the appointee's relationship to the donor. This obviously cannot be known until
the donee of the power of appointment exercises his power, which event
often occurs after the death of the donor. An alternative is to postpone
the determination of the tax until the exercise of the power. State legislatures, including Ohio, have avoided the common law problem, however,
by enacting death tax laws with specific provisions that the power will be
taxed as though it were property passing from the donee and not the donor
of the power. See Orr v. Gilman, 183 U.S. 278 (1902) (upholding the constitutionality of such provisions).
In those states which have specifically enacted inheritance tax statutes
two principal purposes in taxing powers of appointment are apparent: (1)
to make certain that property subject to the power will be taxed sometime
between the time it leaves the hands of the donor and the time it reaches
the ultimate distributee; and (2) to tax the property at a time when speculation as to its ultimate destination has been removed, thus eliminating
conjecture about who are to be beneficiaries and in what amounts. CCH
1965 ST. TAX REP. 1540.
4. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-3-12 (1963); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 14401, 14-430 (1947); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-1520 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 140.040 (1963); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 65, § 2 (1932); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 7.561 (1960); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 145.030 (1952); MONT. REV. CODE
ANN. § 91-4404 (1947); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-16-21 (1954); N.Y. TAX LAW
§ 220-5 (1954); OmIo REV. CODE § 5731.02 (1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §
44-22-7(3) (1956); S.D. CODE § 5220.04 (1939); VA. CODE ANN. § 58-157
(1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 842(1) (1961).
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called on to decide cases that coincide factually with Laffoon.5 In
both, results contrary to the Ohio decision were reached.
This Note will therefore confine its examination of Laffoon to
the decisions of states with similar statutes. A better approach to
the solution of these cases will be suggested.
Mrs. Laffoon's husband, who was never a resident of Ohio,
irrevocably conveyed to a Kentucky trustee certain intangible assets having no claimed relationship to Ohio. The trust instrument
provided that the income from the trust principal was to be paid to
Mrs. Laffoon, who was domiciled in Ohio, until their two children
reached certain ages. Mrs. Laffoon was also given a general power
of appointment over the trust income and a special power of appointment over the trust principal. All trust modifications were
required to be in writing, signed by the donee and delivered to the
trustee. Twice Mrs. Laffoon exercised her power, the first time by
specifying that the income from the trust be paid to her for life
and a second time by specifying a certain disposition of the trust
corpus to her children or their issue at her death. At her death the
donee failed to make any additional exercise of her power by will.
Appellant, the Ohio State Tax Commissioner, contended that
for the purpose of inheritance taxation, Ohio had valid statutory
authority to tax the privilege of succession to appointive property
irrespective of its physical location.' Furthermore, citing the recent decision of People v. Cooke,' the Tax Commissioner argued
that the distinctions drawn as to the nature, manner of creation
and manner of exercise of powers of appointment were without
Both of
substance in regard to Ohio's inheritance transfer tax.'
these contentions were rejected by the court.
9
In this case of first impression the Ohio supreme Court
5. In re Estate of Newton, 35 Cal. 2d 830, 221 P.2d 952 (1950); People
v. Cooke, 150 Colo. 52, 370 P.2d (1961).
In circumstances distinguishable from the instant case only as to the
nature of the power involved or as to the fact that an exercise thereof,
rather than both an exercise and a nonexercise was involved, the following
cases reached results in accord with Laffoon: Walker v. Treasurer, 221
Mass. 600, 109 N.E. 647 (1915); In re Estate of Canda, 197 App. Div. 597,
189 N.Y. Supp. 917 (1921). Contra, Ream v. Department of Revenue, 314
Ky. 539, 236 S.W.2d 462 (1951); State ex rel Smith v. Probate Court, 124
Minn. 508, 145 N.W. 390 (1914); Virginia v. Davis, 200 Va. 308, 105 S.E.2d
819 (1958); In re Estate of Simonds, 188 Wash. 211, 61 P.2d 1302 (1936).
6. Brief for Appellant, pp. 19-28, Schneider v. Laffoon, 4 Ohio St. 2d
89, 212 N.E.2d 801 (1965).
7. 150 Colo. 52, 370 P.2d 896 (1962).
8. Brief for Appellant, pp. 12-18.
9. Another Ohio case factually in point is an unreported case contra
to Laffoon, In re Estate of King, No. 112496, Montgomery County Probate
Court (1950). Here it was held that "the nonexercise of a special power
creates a taxable succession under Ohio statutes." The
of appointment ..
majority in the instant case dismisses In re Estate of King without any
discussion and by implication overrules it.
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reached a correct result in not permitting the levy of a tax; however, it did so for the wrong reasons. The court reasoned that the
Ohio Inheritance Tax Statute was presumed to be adopted from a
previously construed statute in another state, and therefore, that
the construction placed on that statute by the decisional law of the
original state was incorporated into the body of Ohio law. It thus
reached a decision without considering all the relevant Ohio case
law. It is submitted that this court should not have utilized a presumed statutory adoption, for upon close analysis this doctrine
seems inapplicable. Rather, the court should have resorted to the
Ohio decisions which require a similar result and which afford a
firmer basis for justifying this decision.
First enacted in 1919, Ohio's Inheritance Tax Statute10 provides
in essence that the tax shall be imposed upon the succession to any
property passing to a person. The statutory definition of taxable
succession includes the exercise of a power of appointment and
also the passage of property upon the non-exercise, or default, of
a power.
The Ohio law is substantially similar to that of New York"
and Massachusetts, 12 which were enacted prior to Ohio's. The LafJoon court recognized the construction given these statutes in their
respective states and, relying heavily on The Opinions of the Attorney General,3 concluded that the Ohio General Assembly adopted its statute from Massachusetts. 14 Thus, when the Ohio inheri10.

OHIO REV. CODE § 5131.02(D) (1964), provides in pertinent part:
A tax is hereby levied upon the succession to any property
passing, in trust or otherwise, to or for the use of a person or corporation in the following cases:
Whenever any person or corporation exercises a power of appointment derived from any disposition of property, such appointment when made shall be deemed a succession taxable under this
section in the same manner as if the property to which such appointment relates belonged absolutely to the donee of such power
and had been bequeathed or devised by said donee by will; and
whenever any such person or corporation possessing such power
of appointment fails to exercise the same within the time provided
therefor, in whole or in part, a succession taxable under this section takes place as to the property passing by such failure....
In this regard the statutory definitions of "estate" and "property" are also
relevant. Omo REV. CODE § 5731.01 (A) (1964):
"Estate" and "property" include everything capable of ownership, or any interest therein or income therefrom, whether tangible or intangible, and, except as to real estate, whether within or
without this state, which passes to any one person, institution or
corporation from any one person whether by single succession or
not.
In addition to the property specifically enumerated in division
(C) of this section, all intangible personal property within the
jurisdiction of this state shall be subject to the tax levied. ...
11. N.Y. TAx LAWS § 220-5 (1954).
12. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 65, § 2 (1932).
13. 536, No. 3237 (1922).
14. Ohio practice and procedure seem in accord with such a conclusion. See Brief for Appellee, p. 9; whereas Ohio case law would seem to
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tance transfer tax law was enacted, the Massachusetts cases of
Minot v. Treasurer & Receiver General' and Walker v. Treasurer
& Receiver General,' which construed the Massachusetts statute,
were presumptively incorporated therein.
In Walker a Maryland testator established a trust with a Maryland resident as trustee and gave a general power of appointment
to a Massachusetts resident who exercised this power by will, giving the residue again in trust to the same Maryland trustees. This
will was proved in Massachusetts. In holding that no succession
tax could be levied on the property passing under this power the
Walker court said:
It is an implied condition of all statutes relating to taxation
that they have no extraterritorial effect. .

.

Massachu-

setts has no control either of the property or its owner.
An excise tax may be upheld upon the succession to property where a direct property tax might not be sustained.
But in such cases it can stand as a lawful exercise of the
taxing power only when some necessary incident of the
transfer of title depends for its efficacy upon the law of the
state levying the tax. .

.

.

[W]here the property is not

physically within the jurisdiction of the taxing power and
its complete succession may be accomplished without invoking any privilege or sanction conferred by its laws,
7
there is nothing to which taxation can attach ....
Since Maryland, the situs of the trust corpus and residence of the
trustees, could give effect to the exercise of the power irrespective
of the laws of Massachusetts, there was no valid incidence of taxation in Massachusetts; it was not necessary to invoke a privilege or
sanction of Massachusetts.
Similarly, in Laffoon the transfer sought to be taxed was made
by a resident donee who possessed a power of appointment over
foreign situated intangibles in a trust corpus established by a
non-resident donor. Thus, the Laffoon court relied strongly on the
fact that Ohio had adopted the Massachusetts inheritance tax statmilitate in favor of a conclusion that the statute was adopted from New
York. See Wonderly v. Tax Commission, 112 Ohio St. 233, 147 N.E. 509
(1925); Wellman v. Cleveland Trust Co., 107 Ohio St. 204, 140 N.E. 634
(1923). In the Wellman case the court stated "The provisions of our Inheritance Tax Act are substantially the same as the provisions of the Inheritance Tax Act of New York and our Inheritance Tax Act was probably
modeled after the New York Act." Id. at 206, 140 N.E. at 635.
The question of which state's statute was adopted is academic, so long
as either New York's or Massachusetts' case law is applied in construing it.
If the Walker construction is not adopted from Massachusetts, the New York
case law would require a similar result. See In re Brett, 123 Misc. 507, 205
N.Y. Supp. 154 (Surr. Ct. 1922), aff'd without opinion, 206 App. Div. 746,
200 N.Y. Supp. 915 (1925); In re Thomas, 39 Misc. 136, 78 N.Y. Supp. 981
(Surr. Ct. 1902); In re Burch, 160 Misc. 342, 289 N.Y. Supp. 966 (Surr. Ct.
1936).
15. 207 Mass. 588, 93 N.E. 973 (1911).
16. 221 Mass. 600, 109 N.E. 647 (1915).
Accord, Curtis v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 340 Mass. 169, 163 N.E. 151 (1959).
17. 221 Mass. at 602, 109 N.E. at 647-48 (1915).
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ute as limited by the Walker decision:
[W] here the Ohio General Assembly has adopted statutory provisions from another state after those provisions
have been construed by the highest court of that state,
such construction will be given
great weight in this state
8
and will usually be followed.'
This is a general rule of statutory construction. 19 It is not, however, absolute. There are important limitations and qualifications.20 The general rule is not applicable where the construction
given by the originating state to its statute is contrary to the constitution of the adopting state or contrary to the spirit and policies
of its laws. 2' Also, the general rule may not be applied where the
22
construction given the original statute is unsound in principle,
or if there is no sound reason why the foreign construction should
be followed, 23 especially where it is deemed clearly wrong by the
18. Schneider v. Laffoon, 4 Ohio St. 2d at 96, 212 N.E.2d at 801 (1965).
Judge Herbert in his concurring opinion goes so far as to say that the
Massachusetts case controls. 4 Ohio St. 2d at 103, 212 N.E.2d at 810. He

entirely dismisses the collateral examinations as to the constitutional issues
or the difference in the nature of different powers of appointment.
19. See Andrews v. Hovey, 124 U.S. 694 (1887); Phoenix Title & Trust
Co. v. Old Dominion Co., 37 Ariz. 324, 253 Pac. 435 (1927); Clay v. Edwards,
84 N.J.L. 221, 86 Atl. 548 (1913); McNary v. State, 128 Ohio St. 497, 191
N.E. 733 (1934); Black River Lumber Co. v. Kent, 124 Ohio St. 20, 176 N.E.
662 (1931); Chapel State Theater Co. v. Hooper, 123 Ohio St. 322, 175 N.E.
450, aff'd, 284 U.S. 588 (1931). 50 Am. JUR. Statutes § 458 (1944); 82 C.J.S.
Statutes § 372 (1953).
20. See generally 50 Am. Jun. Statutes § 469 (1944); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 373 (1953). One commentator speaks directly to the risks attending
construction with references to other statutes.
Where an adopted statute is referred to by the court, there is
more danger than exists when reenacted statutes are involved.
Undoubtedly it is not always easy to determine what construction
has been placed upon an adopted statute by the state from which
it was adopted. In many cases one cannot be sure that the legislature of the adopting state was familiar with the construction of the
state which first enacted the statute. The case of People v. Cavenee, 368 Ill. 399, 14 N.E.2d 232 (1938), seems to be an example.
There the legislature of Illinois adopted the inheritance tax law of
New York, notwithstanding the fact that the highest court of the
latter state had previously declared part of it unconstitutional.
Although the Illinois court refused to regard the adoption as carrying with it the New York construction on the ground that it could
not be presumed that the legislature intended to do a futile thing,
it would seem just as reasonable to suppose the legislature were
unfamiliar with the action of the New York courts upon the
adopted statute.
It would seem probable that many qualifications, limitations,
and exceptions to the rule which presumes that the construction
placed upon an adopted law follow the law, have been necessary
because of the tendency of the rule to defeat legislative intent.
CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 237 (1940). (Emphasis added.)
21. See White v. White, 196 Ark. 29, 116 S.W.2d 616 (1938); State v.
Cook, 108 Fla. 157, 146 So. 223 (1933).
22. See State v. Chaplin, 101 Kan. 413, 166 Pac. 238 (1917).
23. See State v. Brum, 145 Wash. 435, 260 Pac. 990 (1927); Jacobs v.
Jacobs, 136 Minn. 190, 161 N.W. 525 (1917).
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24
courts of the adopting state.
The decisions in Masachusetts are not so well settled on the
issue in the Laffoon case as to warrant the adoption of the Walker
limitation on the statute. No case concerning the taxation of
both the exercise and non-exercise of special powers of appointment over intangible assets outside the state has ever arisen in
Massachusetts. Furthermore, the weight of the Walker case is
itself questionable.
Walker's reasoning was accepted by the United States Supreme
Court in a case decided eleven years later.25 The Court, however,
specifically overruled this decision in Graves v. Schmidlapp.2 6
Hence, when the validity of Massachusetts law on the question in
Laffoon is considered, it appears that Walker should not have been
given "great weight" by the Ohio court.
The initial inquiryto be made in all inheritance tax cases is
whether or not the state affords some privilege in return for which
it may exact a tax; that is, whether the state has jurisdiction to
impose an inheritance tax. The leading case is State Tax Commissioner v. Aldrich,27 wherein the United States Supreme Court said
that any state "which has extended benefits or protection or which
can demonstrate 'the practical effect of its power' or sovereignty
...may likewise constitutionally make its exaction. '28 Mr. Justice
Frankfurter stated this "benefit theory" even more succinctly:
[T]he sole constitutional test ...is whether the property

was taken without due process of law, or . . . whether the

taxing power exerted by the state bears physical relations
24. In re Reynold's Estate, 90 Utah 415, 62 P.2d 270 (1936); Ancient
Order of Hibernians Co. v. Sparrow, 29 Mont. 132, 74 Pac. 197 (1903). See
In re Wampler's Estate, 60 Ohio L. Abs. 593, 103 N.E.2d 303, 309 (1950),
wherein it is stated that "while it is true the inheritance tax law of Ohio
is copied largely from the New York law, the courts of Ohio are not obliged
to follow the New York case law in its construction." (Emphasis added.)
Accord, Tax Commissioner v. Parker, 117 Ohio St. 215, 221, 158 N.E. 89, 91
(1927); see 38 OHIo JURISPRUDENCE § 430 (1954).
25. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272 U.S. 567, 574-75
(1926), wherein the court stated:
Except perhaps where the instrument which created the power
provides that the appointment must be by will executed according
to the law of the donee's domicile, to be proved and allowed there,
the following propositions are established in Massachusetts: "Personal property over which one has the power of appointment is not
the property of the donee, but of the donor of the power." The
appointee takes, not as the legatee of him who appoints, but of the
original donor. "Property in the hands of domestic trustees appointed under the will of a domestic testator, who conferred a
power of appointment upon a non-resident, must be distributed
according to the law of this Commonwealth and . . . the execution
of the power must be interpreted according to our law in conformity to the power conferred." Walker v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 221 Mass. 600, 602, 603.
26. 315 U.S. 657 (1942).
27. 316 U.S. 174 (1942).
28. Id. at 181-82.
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to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state.
the state
The simple but controlling question is whether
29
has given anything for which it can ask return.
Unless there is some nexus between the state and the succession to
foreign situated property, imposition of a tax on that succession
violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.3 0
Ohio has also passed on this question. In Guaranty Trust Co.
v. State,"' the Ohio Court of Appeals held that the state was not
authorized to impose an inheritance tax on deposits in an Ohio
bank, belonging to a non-resident decedent when documentary evidence of the deposits was also outside of Ohio. The court's reasoning shows that Ohio will tax a succession only when the actual
succession itself is governed by Ohio law:
The state of Ohio undoubtedly has no right to impose
a tax upon the privilege of transfer, because the Supreme
Court of the United States holds that the state of Ohio
confers no privilege with respect to the succession to class
of property under discussion. If the state of Ohio confers
no privilege as to succession, it32 cannot put a tax on the
privilege which it cannot confer.
Further, in reference to intangible personal property, the court in
Guaranty Trust interpreted the phrase "property within this
state" to mean that "succession thereto is for any purpose governed
by the laws of this state."3 3 This case deserves recognition as a
guiding authority in Ohio law on the question of imposing an inheritance tax on certain successions.
In Laffoon no privilege or sanction granted by the laws of Ohio
is required to effectuate the succession by the appointees to the
intangible property. The power could be exercised only by a writ29. Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940). (Emphasis
added.) The authorities for this proposition are numerous and all trace
their origin to McCullock v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 429 (1819).
See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900). Accord, Treichler v. Wisconsin,
338 U.S. 251, 257 (1949); Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189 (1902). Cf.
Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657 (1942); Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S.
357 (1939); United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625 (1895). See generally
85 C.J.S. Taxation § 1114 (1954).
30. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Kelly, 319 U.S. 941 (1943);
Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939). Until the decision of Curry v.
McCanless, the fourteenth amendment had been viewed as prohibiting taxation of a property transaction by more than one state. In Curry, however, the "single situs" theory of taxation was displaced by the "benefit
test," under which the right of a state to tax depends upon whether or not
any benefit has been conferred by that state.
31. 36 Ohio App. 45, 172 N.E. 675 (1937).
32. Id. at 53, 172 N.E. 677-78. (Emphasis added.) Citing Cassidy v.
Ellerhorst, the court reiterated that "it is not the property but the 'succession thereto,' which must become the basis of the inquiry." 110 Ohio St.
535, 541, 144 N.E. 252, 254 (1924).
33. Guaranty Trust Co. v. State, 36 Ohio App. 45, 172 N.E. 675, 677
(1937).
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ten instrument delivered to the Kentucky trustee. The mechanism
of Kentucky law vitalizes this writing and effects the transfer of
funds from the trust corpus. Even if Ohio were to have abolished
all powers of appointment, this appointment would have been exercisable by Mrs. Laffoon since the laws of Kentucky would recognize her power and operate to protect its exercise. Hence, in
Laffoon the Tax Commissioner is in no position to argue for taxation of either the exercise or non-exercise of this power (both of
which effect a transfer of trust assets), because Ohio has no jurisdiction over this succession.
COMIPARISON oF' LAFFOON WIH SIMILAR CASES

Each of the four states whose courts have been called upon to
decide whether the state's power of taxation may extend to the
exercise or non-exercise of a special power over foreign situated

intangibles-California, Colorado, Massachusetts, and Ohio-impose
an inheritance tax on the succession to property over which its
residents possess either a general or special power of appointment,
without regard to whether or not the power is exercised. Like
Laffoon in Ohio, People v. Cookes4 in Colorado and In re Estate of

Newton 5 in California were also cases of first impression."
In
construing statutes substantially similar to Ohio's, the Colorado
and California courts, however, reached an opposite result from
the Ohio court. The result in Newton can be sanctioned because of
a salient factual distinction from Laffoon: California did have tax34. 150 Colo. 52, 370 P.2d 896 (1962).
35. 35 Cal.2d 830, 221 P.2d 952 (1950).
36. In Newton the facts were essentially the following: The power
of appointment had been created by the will of the decedent's father who
left a testamentary trust of considerable intangible property. The trust
provided for an income to the son for life and for a power by will to appoint his wife (thus a special power) to take on his death a specified proportion of the trust estate. California was the residence of the son at the
time of his death, but New York was his residence at the time of the execution of his will, as well as the residence of the father at the time of the
latter's death, and the residence of the trustees. The California Statute,
CAL. REv. & TAx CODE § 13693, imposing a tax on a gift of a power of appointment created by a resident donor, contained a saving clause applicable to powers of appointment created by donors dying prior to the statute's
effective date (1935), under which savings clause the tax was imposed on
the exercise of the power of appointment by a resident donee. The death
of the father prior to the effective date of the statute called for the application of the saving clause to the son's exercise of the power.
In People v. Cooke, a Connecticut resident set up a trust of intangible
assets with a New York trust company as trustee. The trust assets were
always situated in New York. An income beneficiary was given a general
power of appointment. The donee reduced this general power to a special
power and thereafter moved to Colorado, where she executed her will and
eventually died. Donee-decedent's will provided that it was her intention
not to exercise her power at her death. Thus, the trust assets were distributed to the decedent's issue in accordance with the trust terms set up
by the donor.
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ing jurisdiction over the succession in question because its laws
gave effect to the will of the donee of the power, through which
the power was exercised. The Cooke decision, however, cannot be
reconciled with the Laffoon holding by distinguishing the two
cases, for the Colorado facts are squarely in point.
In Cooke an unexercised special power of appointment over
foreign situated intangible property was held to constitute a sufficient nexus to impose the Colorado inheritance tax without contravening the due process requirements. The Colorado court
examined principles of taxation concerning foreign situated intangibles where the decedent resident possessed 1) an exercised general power, 2) an exercised special power, 3) an unexercised general power, 4) an unexercised special power. The pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court are controlling authority
on the federal questions of whether the due process requirements
for imposing an inheritance tax are satisfied.
The rule applicable to the first situation, exercised general
powers of appointment over foreign situated intangibles, is that the
state of the donee's domicile may impose an inheritance tax thereon.
The Supreme Court in Graves v. Schmidlapp37 stated: "[F]or the
purposes of estate and inheritance taxation, the power to dispose of
property at death is the equivalent of ownership."38 Thus, in exercising his power the donee ultimately determines to whom the
property will succeed. The court said in dictum that this was true
whether the power is special or general. It is significant to note,
however, that the Schmidlapp court concluded that "it is the exercise of the power to dispose of intangibles that is the taxable
event." 9 Taxation of the exercise of a special power of appointment over intangibles in the donee's estate has 40likewise been declared not violative of the due process guarantees.
Graves v. Elliott4' controls the third situation, i.e., unexer-

cised general powers of appointment over intangibles outside the
taxing state. Here, the relinquishment at death by a New York
resident of a power to revoke a trust of intangibles created in
37. 315 U.S. 657 (1942); accord, Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357
(1939).. There was, however, no jurisdictional difficulty here because the
laws of the taxing state, Massachusetts, were utilized to effect the appointment; the donor, donee and trustees of the trust being residents and
the exercise of the power taking place in the donee's will probated in
Massachusetts.
38. 315 U.S. at 660. (Emphasis added.)
39. Id. at 662. (Emphasis added.)
40. Whitney v. State Tax Comm'r, 309 U.S. 530 (1940).
41. 357 U.S. 383 (1939). In taxing the intangibles held and administered in Colorado, the New York court satisfied the jurisdictional requirement that the donee of the power over these intangibles released that
power in a will probated in New York, to which New York's laws necessarily had to give effect; accord, Minot v. Treasurer & Receiver General,
207 Mass. 588, 93 N.E. 973 (1911).
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Colorado and held by a Colorado trustee, was held to constitute a
valid subject of New York's inheritance tax law. Even though the
donee does not exercise his power, the court reasoned, he nonetheless controls the succession of property. Upon his failure to
exercise or his deliberate omission to exercise this power, the property succeeds or is permitted to succeed to the persons who are
designated in the will of the donor.
Having to reach a decision on the fourth category-that of the
non-exercise of a special power-the Colorado Supreme Court in
42
Cooke resorted to reasoning by analogy. In drawing on all three
of the preceding cases, it concluded that since an unexercised general power was taxable because it determined the course of succession, so also was the non-exercise of a special power taxable
because it too determined the course of succession.
Laffoon, however, rejected that analysis and recognized an important oversight of the Colorado decision. The Cooke court appears to have failed to recognize that when a power can be exercised in such a manner (or its non-exercise can cause a similar
result) so as to effect a transfer of the appointed property without
resort to the legal processes of the donee's state, no jurisdiction to
impose the tax on the succession exists. Thus, since Colorado has
established no justification for its jurisdiction to tax the succession
in question, the result reached in Cooke must be labeled as erroneous. 3 It would seem that the decision in Laffoon, that the state
does not have jurisdiction to tax, is proper.
42. In Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657 (1942); Graves v. Elliott,
357 U.S. 383 (1939); and Whitney v. State Tax Comm'r, 309 U.S. 530 (1940),
the United States Supreme Court, having found that the taxing state had
jurisdiction over each particular transfer, also concluded that the donee of
the power determines the course of succession of the appointed property.
In Schmidlapp and Elliott, however, the donee not only possessed a power
of appointment over the property but also had a life interest in the property. In Whitney, the limited class of persons to whom the donee could
appoint consisted of the same class to whom the property would succeed
under the will of the donor upon a failure of the donee to exercise his
power.

It may not be too unreasonable, therefore, to conclude that the essence

of these decisions lies in the life interest the donee had in the property
subject to the power, rather than in the fact that the donee of the power
determined the course of succession of property. However, because such
a conclusion directly contravenes the express reasons given by the Court,
it is entitled to little weight.
43. Even more unacceptable results may be occasioned if the Cooke
rule were to be rigidly applied. See, e.g., 43 B.U. L. REV. 339 (1963), elucidating the following hypothetical in which a strict application of the Cooke
rule would frustrate the reason underlying inheritance taxes: Donor, a
resident of state X establishes a trust with the income to donor's children
for the life of A (a friend of donor) and a special power of appointment
in A to designate those of donor's children who shall take the corpus on
A's death. The trust consists of $200,000 and is situated in state X. A
domiciled in state Y expressly refuses to exercise his power. A's own estate consists of $20,000 worth of property situated in state Y. If state Y
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THE UNANSWERED PROBLEM OF THE DoNEE's "PROPERTY INTEREST"
State legislatures have created artificial concepts of passage
of property for purposes of taxation in several situations. There is
substantial confusion in applying these concepts to powers of appointment, as is evidenced in the divergent results in People v.
Cooke and Schneider v. Laffoon. Often this confusion is attributable to the statutes themselves, which provide that the exercise
(or, alternatively, the exercise or non-exercise) of general (or,
alternatively, general and special) powers of appointment will be
treated as if the property
belonged absolutely to the donee and
44

passed by his will.

Even if the Laffoon court found jurisdiction to impose a tax
(as, for example, if the donor of the power of appointment were a
resident of Ohio), it would still be unwilling to tax this succession
to foreign intangibles. The Ohio court reasoned that nothing passes
from the donee of this special power at death. The donee had no
interest in the property because his special power of appointment
is not the equivalent of "property."45 Even assuming, however,
that the donee's interest in the power is not "property," such a
conclusion is not dispositive of whether an inheritance tax may be
imposed on a succession resulting therefrom. The majority of the
Ohio court is committing the same fallacy that underlies a portion
of the dissenting opinion 46 and the rationale of Cooke, since they
can impose an inheritance tax on the trust located in state X simply on the
basis that the unexercised power provides the requisite nexus between the
donee and the property, the personal estate of A, situated in state Y, will
be consumed to pay an inheritance tax upon the property in which he had
no beneficial or economic interest whatsoever.
An attempt to impose a tax under such circumstances would, it is submitted, be struck down as an unconstitutional taking of property in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The possibility nonetheless exists.
44. See the Ohio Inheritance Tax Statute supra note 10.
45. Schneider v. Laffoon, 4 Ohio St. at 100, 212 N.E.2d at 807-08
(1965).
46. It is obvious that the dissenting members of the Laffoon court fail
to appreciate this distinction. In his dissenting opinion Justice O'Neill adds
emphasis by italicizing the word "property" in both the definition section
of the inheritance tax statute, OHIo REV. CODE § 5731.01 (A) (1964), and also
in the section providing for taxation of the exercise or nonexercise of powers, § 5731.01 (D) (1964). If any word bears emphasis in this setting, however, it is "succession," for without the succession sanctioned by Ohio law,
Ohio has no jurisdiction to levy a tax. Thus, properly emphasized § 5731.02
(A) reads: "A tax is hereby levied upon the succession to any property
passing in trust or otherwise, to or for the use of a person....
If in this case the thing being transferred were the power itself and
not the property subject to the power, then the succession to the power
itself would be the incidence or subject matter of the tax. In this context
the word "property" would deserve emphasis and the relevant inquiry
would be whether the power of appointment itself were the equivalent of
property to bring it within the purview of the taxing statute. It must be
remembered, however, that the succession being taxed in Laffoon is the
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are willing to place controlling weight on whether or not that
which the donee had was the equivalent of a property interest.
That the tax is imposed upon the succession to property cannot be
overemphasized. Since the artificial concept of property in the
donee of a power has been established by statute and upheld as
constitutional by case law,4 7 whether or not a special power of appointment is the equivalent of property is not important.
It is submitted that the reasoning of the Laffoon court, in
saying that no interest passes from the donee of this special power
of appointment because his interest therein is not the equivalent
of property, is fallacious for two reasons. First, like the Cooke
court, the Ohio court is misconstruing the relevant United States
Supreme Court decisions. Second, even if the proper interpretation of these cases were that the donee of a special power of appointment over foreign intangibles must have the equivalent of
property in order for the tax to be imposed, the better reasoning
dictates that the interest in and the power over the appointive
property is sufficient ownership to allow its taxation.
First, perhaps Cooke and Laffoon have misinterpreted the decisions on this point because the United States Supreme Court in
a series of cases 48 seems, on first analysis, to be saying that the
measure of an inheritance tax imposed on the exercise or nonexercise of powers of appointment over foreign intangibles must be
the equivalent of property. That is, between the donee of the
power and the property itself there must exist a relationship
which can be called ownership. In each of these cases, none of
which deal with the non-exercise of a special power over foreign
intangibles, it is indeed true that the court is saying that what
the donee has is the equivalent of property. However, the court is
certainly not holding that in order to measure the inheritance tax,
the donee of the power is required to have the equivalent of a
property interest.
succession to the property passing via the exercise or nonexercise of the
power.
47. Orr v. Gilman, 183 U.S. 278 (1902).
48. Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657 (1942); Whitney v. State Tax
Comm'r, 309 U.S. 530 (1940); Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939);
Graves v. Elliott, 307 U.S. 383 (1939); Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625
(1916).
The exact language of the Court is helpful in understanding this concept. "As sources of actual or potential wealth-which is an appropriate
measure of any tax imposed on ownership or its exercise- they [rights
over intangible property] cannot be disassociated from the persons from
whose relationship they are derived." Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 366
(1939). "If death may be made the occasion for taxing property in which
decedent had no beneficial interest, then the measurement of that tax by
the decedent's total wealth-disposing power is merely an exercise of legislative discretion in determining what the state shall take in return for
allowing the transfer." Whitney v. State Tax Comm'r, 309 U.S. 530, 540
(1940).
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On the question of whether that which a donee of a power
possesses must be the equivalent of property in order for a state to
impose an inheritance tax, the Laffoon reasoning should be rejected as an improper statement of the law. Moreover, if this
portion of the Laffoon decision were accepted, then the logical result which a court deciding a similar case must reach is that there
are two constitutional due process requirements for imposing this
tax: first, jurisdiction over the transfer or succession in question
(that is, that the laws of the taxing state be utilized in some way
before a tax may be exacted); and second, a relationship between
the donee of the power and the property itself which can be
called a property interest. The second requirement has no basis
in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and produces
an unnecessary restriction on the inherent taxing power of a state.
If a state legislature were to include powers of appointment in
the class of property subject to an ad valorem tax on personal
property, then it would be a valid requirement of due process that
the donee of a power have the equivalent of ownership in the
property subject to the power. For an inheritance tax, i.e. an
excise tax levied on the succession to property, there is, however,
no valid reason why courts should have to strain to decide whether
what the donee had was really ownership or property. Thus,
once the state has found that it does have jurisdiction over the
succession in question since its legal processes have afforded the
transfer some measure of protection or effectiveness, it seems unnecessary and illogical for any further hurdle to be crossed.
Second, assuming arguendo,that the Ohio Supreme Court were
correct in its interpretation of the relevant United States Supreme
Court cases, so that the donee of a special power of appointment
over foreign intangibles would be required to have the equivalent
of property in order for the tax to be imposed, the better reasoning demands the recognition that the donee's power over the appointive property is sufficient ownership to allow its taxation.
The Ohio court recognizes substantial differences between a
general and special power of appointment. That a donee of a special power may not appoint property to himself seemed of great
importance, for Chief Justice Taft stated in Laffoon:
Therefore, unlike the donee of a general power, the donee
of a special power has nothing which may reasonably be
regarded as representing an interest of the donee in that
property. Hence, no interest in the property passes from
49
the donee thereof on the nonexercise of such a power.
The court's logic is vulnerable on this point. Whether or not
a special power is technically designated a "property interest," in
substance the donee has control over a shift of economic benefits
and a possible economic advantage himself. To the extent that the
49.

4 Ohio St.2d at 104, 212 N.E.2d at 808.

Spring 1967]

NOTES

amount of property value appointed by the donee (or passing
through his failure to exercise his power) the donee need not bequeath from his own funds if the appointive property passes to
one of his heirs.
The Ohio tax law defines a "succession" as the "passage of
property in possession or enjoyment, present or future." 50 The
Ohio Supreme Court has considered cases wherein the shifting of
economic benefits, by reason of the termination of someone's power
or control over the property, has given rise to a taxable succession.
In each of these cases there was no jurisdictional difficulty because the shifting of economic benefits was accomplished by Ohio
law, unlike Laffoon wherein the exercise of Ohio law had nothing
to do with the shifting of benefits. Commissioner v. Hutchinson5l
determined that the interest of a husband in a joint bank account
accruing to his wife at his death subjected his estate to a succession tax. Here the court rejected the argument that since the wife
had the same power to consume the whole estate after the death of
her husband as before his death, no additional right or taxable
succession accrued to her upon his death. The court pointed out
that the husband's death caused a cessation of his power to exercise
control over the deposit and vested exclusive possession and enjoyment in the wife by survivorship. It was this interest, gained by
survivorship, that was taxable.
Similarly, In re Estate of Evans 2 held that the death of a coowner of joint and survivorship property effects a shift of economic
benefits to the survivor; it is therefore constitutionally taxable as
a succession under the Ohio statute. The Evans court reasoned
that an estate tax is not levied on property of which the estate is
composed, but is imposed on the shifting, transmitting and receiving of economic benefits.
In the light of these analogous cases adjudicated in Ohio courts,
the conclusion is inescapable that the control of a donee of a special
power over the shifting of economic benefits would be sufficient to
impose a tax if the first requirement of an inheritance tax, that of
jurisdiction, were satisfied.
CONCLUSION

Schneider v. Laffoon is a correct decision; the reasons assigned
for this result are, however, inadequate. The court rests its decision, that Ohio may not impose an inheritance tax on this succession, on the presumed statutory adoption of the constructions given
the Massachusetts statute in Walker v. Treasurer & Receiver General.53 This interpretation was concerned with neither the non50.
51.
52.
53.

OmIo REV. CODE § 4731.01(B) (1964).
120 Ohio St. 361, 166 N.E.2d 352 (1962).
173 Ohio St. 137, 180 N.E.2d 827 (1962).
221 Mass. 600, 109 N.E. 647 (1915).
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exercise of a power nor a special power of appointment, both of
which are pivotal issues in the instant case. Furthermore, the
weight which can be accorded to Walker was decreased by Graves
v. Schmidlapp.5 4 Thus, the Laffoon court should have applied the
rules established by prior Ohio cases, which require the same result.
The real import of this decision lies not so much in what it did
as in what it failed to do. The Ohio Supreme Court did not identify and separate its inquiries into the nature, subject matter
and measure of this levy of an inheritance tax on the exercise or
nonexercise of a special power of appointment over foreign located
intangible assets. In this respect it is not unlike other courts which
have undertaken to decide similar questions. To eliminate this
confusion it is submitted that courts analyze future cases by first
answering the following inquiry: Does the state have jurisdiction
over the particular subject matter sought to be taxed; that is, does
the state accord the benefit of its laws to this succession in return
for which it may exact a tax? Because the subject matter of an
inheritance tax is the succession to property, it is suggested that
courts disregard the issue of whether that which the donee of a
power had prior to the exercise of his power was the equivalent of
a property interest. The succession itself is the incidence of the
tax and not the property interest which the donee of the power
may or may not possess in that power. Furthermore, if a court
feels compelled to attack this issue, it is submitted that a special
power of appointment is equivalent to a property interest because
it may effect a shifting of economic assets as equally as a general
power does. 55
Utilization of this form of analysis can immeasurably simplify
a courts task of determining if a tax is justifiably levied in these
complex cases; it also tends to preclude erroneous results by making clear precisely what is to be decided, through what processes
and in what order.
RoGER J. Ecxxa

54.

315 U.S. 657 (1942).

55. This is the position taken in People v. Cooke, 150 Colo. 52, 370 P.2d
896 (1962), and seems founded upon the better reasoning. Although this
aspect of the Cooke decision is sound, the result that Colorado could impose a tax on the succession must be questioned because Colorado did not
have jurisdiction over this succession.

